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 1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical products are developed worldwide, and pharmaceutical companies supply not only do-
mestic but also foreign markets. When supplying foreign markets, it is often observed that ﬁrms enter
alliances. An originator ﬁrm and a potential rival ﬁrm sign a contract of marketing and promotion and
the rival ﬁrm supplies the originator ﬁrm’s drug under its name, or the ﬁrms jointly engage in local
clinical trial activities and sell the product together. For example, an HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor
developed by Novartis is sold under the name “Lescol” in Canada and the US. In Japan, Novartis and
Mitsubishi–Tanabe Pharma undertook joint clinical trials in Japan and sold it under the name of “Lo-
chol”. This type of alliance practice has been observed in other industries, such as the automotive and
electronics industries.1 In recent years, there has been concern about the remarkable surge in the num-
ber of international strategic alliances in the global economy and the consequences of such cross-border
activities (OECD (2001)).
Alliances can be classiﬁed into two types: technology oriented and market oriented (Rothaermel
(2001)). The activities we focus on here are market-oriented alliances, including regulatory manage-
ment, marketing, and sales. A ﬁrm may form an alliance or license its product to a potential rival in
order to supply through the rival’s distribution channel. Such international strategic alliances aect not
only ﬁrm revenue structures but also the international drug supply pattern. Firms may not be able to
raise revenue eectively if the entry channel is restricted. Moreover, drugs may not be introduced into
such markets. Therefore, the impact on world welfare is signiﬁcant. In order to assess the causes and
eects of growing alliance activities, it is important to investigate what kinds of determinants aect
international strategic alliances. The trade literature focuses on the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the
1For example, the Japanese automotive company Subaru sells cars for the Swedish company Volvo in Japan, and the
Taiwanese personal computer manufacturer Acer produces its own brand of PC and also supplies Japanese PC makers.
2decision to export or invest abroad (Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)). However,
unlike direct investment and technological alliances, marketing alliances have not been extensively em-
pirically examined. In addition, because there are studies examining the relationship between trade and
quality (Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005)), characteristics other than ﬁrm heterogeneity,
such as product and market heterogeneity, have become important focuses.
This paper addresses the question of what kinds of factors are signiﬁcant for the choice between
market-oriented alliances (licensing to potential rivals) and direct launch (supplying their own products)
using Japanese pharmaceutical company data. Firms may form alliances when they have complemen-
tary assets or the innovator ﬁrm faces diculties establishing its own distribution channel. In either
case, drug supply patterns can be aected substantially by ﬁrm strategies. Therefore, examining entry
mode choice provides additional insights into pharmaceutical entry patterns, which has been an impor-
tant issue in the literature on the pharmaceutical industry (for example, Scott Morton (1999) and Kyle
(2006, 2007)). We examine the modes of drug supply to 40 countries of 100 drugs developed by 33
ﬁrms in 2007. Our empirical speciﬁcation treats ﬁrms’ entry choices as no entry, direct launch, and al-
liances, and we investigate three types of determinants: ﬁrm-speciﬁc, drug-speciﬁc, and market-speciﬁc
factors.
Previous literature relevant to this paper is on international strategic alliances and international li-
censing. Because of the recent increases in the numbers of international alliances, several studies such
as Chen (2003), Qiu (2006), and Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki (2008) have examined cases in which
manufacturers horizontally related to each other enter foreign markets by using rivals’ distribution chan-
nels. This horizontal structure, which is dierent from the vertical structure where manufacturers and
retailers are vertically separated, raises important issues of the relationship between entry mode and
rivalry in the product market. However, the literature on international horizontal alliances, or what we
3call marketing alliances, is to our knowledge limited to theoretical works. Many empirical studies on
alliances deal with technological alliances and analyze the structure or determinants of alliances (for
example, Lerner and Merges (1998) and Fosfuri (2004)). Because the focus of this paper is on the
choice between marketing alliances and nonalliance supply strategies, which has not been extensively
studied in the literature, our study contributes to the strategic alliance literature.
Because we deal with the choice of distribution channel into foreign markets, our study is related to
the studies on foreign market entry mode choice. In the international trade literature, the determinants
of the choice between export, licensing, and direct investment have been analyzed (for example, Ethier
and Markusen (1996)). In particular, since we regard marketing licensing, comarketing, or copromoting
agreementsasalliances, ourstudyiscloselyrelatedtothelicensingliterature. HorstmannandMarkusen
(1987) examine the distribution channel choice between licensing and direct investment. This paper
applies Horstmann and Markusen’s (1987) framework to consider a similar distribution channel choice:
alliance versus direct launch. In the pharmaceutical market, even if there are aliates in local markets,
drugs can be supplied through alliances. Therefore, the choice between an alliance and direct launch
is appropriate. Empirical studies of marketing licensing are rare (McCalman (2004)); therefore, our
contribution to the licensing literature shows the relationship between the alliance choice and ﬁrm,
drug, and market characteristics, such as scope economies, drug proﬁtability, and intellectual property
protection (IPP).
From our estimations, we identify the determinants of international strategic alliances. We show the
eects of ﬁrm characteristics on entry channel: scope economies encourage direct launches but discour-
age alliances. As Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show, scope economies and research productivity
are positively related. The trade literature focuses on the relationship between foreign entry mode and
productivity. For example, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) show that most productive ﬁrms invest
4abroad. Our results provide additional ﬁndings about the relationship between ﬁrm characteristics and
foreign entry strategy, strategic alliances.
Because we consider entry mode pattern in each market and product, our data variation in markets
and products can help identify the kinds of determinants in addition to ﬁrm heterogeneity that are signif-
icant for market entry strategies. The positive determinant of alliances is strong IPP, which is consistent
with studies showing that trade and IPP are positively related (Smith (2001) and Yang and Maskus
(2001)). The negative determinant is the size of the world market for the drug. The previous literature
shows that high income countries export high quality goods (Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow
(2005)). Our result implies that low rather than high quality goods are supplied through alliances. We
also ﬁnd that imitation opportunities in local markets discourage direct launches. These estimation re-
sults reveal how ﬁrm entry strategy depends on product- and market-speciﬁc factors. Pharmaceutical
ﬁrms with smaller scope economies prefer alliances in strong IPP countries if their drugs have relatively
small market potential.
Our results also provide ﬁndings consistent with the theories of the licensing literature: innovations
capturing large markets are less likely to be licensed and more likely to be supplied by the originators
(Katz and Shapiro (1985)), and products with less uncertainty in sales are likely to be licensed (Rock-
ett (1990)). Therefore, our study provides additional insights into the determinants of cross-border
licensing transactions.
As we mentioned, this study considers marketing licensing as alliance. With respect to marketing or
sales strategies, the role of local distribution sectors has been investigated in the trade literature (for ex-
ample, Richardson (2004)). However, this paper does not deal with structures where manufacturers and
retailers are vertically separated. Rather, we focus on cases where manufacturers use a potential rival’s
distribution channel or brand name to enter the market. In this sense, our study is dierent from the re-
5tail contract literature (see for example, Lafontaine and Slade (1997)). In previous empirical studies on
licensing, the analysis has been of the structure and determinants of technology licensing (Anand and
Khanna (2000), Link and Scott (2002), and Nagaoka and Kwon (2006)), and the international transac-
tion pattern has been investigated by using country-level aggregated data on licensing royalty payments
(Smith (2001) and Yang and Maskus (2001)). This paper studies the problem of ﬁrms’ choice of li-
censing associated with distribution activities. Therefore, our empirical ﬁndings are complementary to
those of the empirical studies of franchise and technology licensing.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data set, and in Section 3 we
demonstrate ﬁrm behavior of the choice between direct launches and marketing alliances and specify
our empirical framework. Then we report our estimation results and discuss the implications in Section
4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Data
The data source we use in this study is Pharmaprojects by BBJ Publishing. This data source includes
about 40,000 drug data developed worldwide. The data are recorded by the following categories: drugs,
companies, and therapies. Hence, we can identify, for example, who is the originator, whether the
drug is licensed, and in which country the drug has been launched. Pharmaprojects uses the therapy
classiﬁcation code of the European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association, which has 17 broad
classiﬁcations and 218 narrow classiﬁcations. For example, as a broad classiﬁcation, there is “A: Ali-
mentary/Metabolic products” as a broad class and “A1A: stomatological” as a narrow class. In addition,
the data includes the current status of drugs, such as the clinical trial or launched stages, in 40 countries
in 2007. In the previous literature, Kyle (2006, 2007) use the Pharmaprojects data to analyze the deter-
minants of drug launches and examine the eect of price regulations and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
6This paper uses data from Japanese pharmaceutical companies. We selected the ﬁrms that launched
new drugs on a market between 1997 and 2007. We can identify in which market and therapy a drug
has been launched. Hence, we constructed a drug–country pair and considered each pair as a unit of
the sample. The number of sample ﬁrms is 33 and the number of launched drugs is 100. Thus, the
number of units in the sample is 100 drugs  40 countries = 4000. The number of therapeutic classes
that our sample drugs belong to is 52 according to narrow classiﬁcation. Several statuses are reported in
Pharmaprojects, such as “Pre-clinical”, “Phase I”, “Launched”, and “Suspended”. The status we focus
on in this paper is “Launched”.
In order to discover whether a particular drug is supplied through an alliance in a particular country,
we checked the data ﬁle on each drug. If the drug is described as launched by other companies, and in
that country the drug’s status is launched, we treat the drug in that market as launched by an alliance. In
addition, if a comarketing or copromotion agreement is recorded, we regard this as a marketing alliance.
If the drug is licensed for marketing worldwide, we treat it as launched by an alliance. An exception is
for markets where there is a special note such as “excluding Japan”. Because we use the updated data
ﬁle from 2007, we may treat the case as a marketing alliance when licensing occurred at a clinical stage
before 2007, the ﬁrms succeeded in passing clinical trials, and then sell it jointly in 2007. Therefore,
our sample data may include a broader class of alliance. On the other hand, we consider a direct launch
as one where the drug is launched but there is no mention of an alliance. Hence, we treat the entry mode
as an alliance if there is a marketing alliance that includes a licensing agreement in any form. This may
create a possibility that our analysis handles the likelihood of direct launches conservatively.
We use the variables associated with markets and drugs to control for these characteristics. Table
1 reports summary statistics. The market variables are population, GDP (from the World Development
Indicators Database), an IPP measure (Park and Wagh (2002)), the number of drugs in the same class in
7a country (“Same Class in a Country”), and the number of local pharmaceutical ﬁrms (“Local Firms”).
IPP measure is an index of each country’s strength of IPP, which ranges from 0 (lowest protection) to
5 (highest protection), and the average of sample countries is 3.69. The number of drugs in the same
therapy class in a country indicates the characteristics of local pattern of health and diseases and the
local regulatory regime in each country. Local Firms is the number of pharmaceutical companies in a
country, which may reﬂect imitation opportunities. On average, there are 12.7 pharmaceutical ﬁrms in
a country.
With respect to drug characteristics, “World Competitors” is the number of companies producing
drugs in the same therapy class in the world. This shows potential competitive pressure globally. With
respect to ﬁrm characteristics, “Drugs Each Firm” is the number of drugs this ﬁrm has been associated
with (including developing, licensing, launching, and even suspending), indicating the experience or
scope economies of ﬁrms. This can be a proxy for the amount of research projects that ﬁrms have
engaged in. On the other hand, “Drugs Active” is the number of active drugs of each ﬁrm, in which
active drugs mean drugs under development or expected to be launched on a market. Because there are
three ﬁrms that did not have active drugs in 2007, the minimum value is 0. While in the analysis we use
Drugs Each Firm, the correlation between Drugs Each Firm and Drugs Active is high at 0.894.
Our empirical analysis examines the ﬁrm entry pattern in each market. Figure 1 shows the number
of alliances by our sample ﬁrms in each market. While we can see that the number of alliances is large
in Germany, Japan, Korea, and the US, alliances occur all over the world.
3 Model
In this section, we introduce a simple conceptual framework for alliances and establish the empirical
speciﬁcations.
8Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Max Min
Population (thousands) 106,355.9 264,175.6 1,311,798 462
GDP (mil. USD) 1,085,523 2,180,104 13,201,819 41,382
IPP 3.69 0.72 5 2.18
Same Class in a Country 6.32 5.26 33 0
Local Firms 12.7 31.94 192 0
World Competitors 256.71 196.31 1129 8
Drugs Each Firm 118.55 138.38 546 3
Drugs Active 33.24 26.553 75 0
Number of Countries = 40
Number of Drugs = 100
Number of Firms = 33
Sample Size (Country–Drug pairs) = 4000
3.1 Marketing Alliance
This study treats each drug–country pair as a sample unit and examines the ﬁrm strategies for each
local market entry. There are basically three choices for innovator ﬁrms: no launch; direct launch;
and an alliance, including licensing. The choice problem is formulated as the choice between these
three alternatives. We assume that ﬁrms make entry decisions in each market independently as in Kyle
(2006, 2007).
Because we do not consider technology licensing, but alliances including distribution activities
such as promotion and marketing, we apply Horstmann and Markusen’s (1987) framework, in which
the choice between direct investment and licensing to enter a foreign market is examined. Consider
the case in which an originator ﬁrm (licensor) has a new drug and seeks to launch it in a market. The
available channels for the ﬁrm to enter the market are either launching it by itself (direct launch) or
ﬁnding a partner ﬁrm (licensee) to form an alliance to sell it. Assume that when ﬁrms negotiate an
alliance, the originator ﬁrm that owns the intellectual property has all the bargaining power. Therefore,
we consider the decision to form an alliance to be made by the originator.
9Figure 1: The number of drugs supplied by alliances among sample ﬁrms in each country
The payos of each entry mode are as follows. When the originator decides to launch directly, the
proﬁt is expressed by  = R   C, where R is the revenue from the market and C is the production cost.
On the other hand, when an alliance occurs, if the licensing fee is S, the proﬁt for the partner ﬁrm is
A  S = R CA  S. We consider that this licensing fee is paid per period, so if the contract continues,
the partner ﬁrm pays S in each period. We assume that the partner ﬁrm has a cost advantage in the
market, therefore, C > CA. If the product is not licensed, the proﬁt of the partner ﬁrm is assumed to be
zero.
Because alliances and licensing agreements do not perfectly cover intellectual property rights, we
assume that the partner ﬁrm is able to produce an imitation product at low cost. If the partner ﬁrm
does so, the proﬁt is C   S = R   C   S, where CA > C. However, in this case we assume that the
alliance is terminated in the next period and the partner ﬁrm will obtain zero proﬁt after that due to the
10inaccessibility of the intellectual property. If the partner ﬁrm does not produce an imitation good, we
assume that the alliance contract continues forever. Therefore, the incentive compatible condition for







where r is the discount rate.
In equilibrium, if the direct launch cost C is suciently high, an alliance occurs. The equilibrium
licensing fee is S  = (1 + r)A   rC from Equation 1. In this case, the originator ﬁrm obtains S .
Therefore, the choice between no launch, direct launch, and an alliance depends on the following rela-
tionship: if  > S  and 0; direct launch, if S  >  and 0; there is an alliance, and if 0 >  and S ; there
is no launch. The payo from each choice is a function of the revenues and costs from the local market
( = (R;C) and S  = S (R;CA;C)). Therefore, the factors aecting the revenues and costs, X, have
an impact on the choice of each mode through R(X), C(X), CA(X), and C(X).
In the empirical speciﬁcation section, we consider the factors aecting the entry mode choice in
detail. Here, we present the representative empirical hypotheses associated with country, company, and
drug characteristics.
 If IPP is severe, an alliance is likely to be chosen.
 If there are scope economies, the likelihood of a direct launch is high.
 If the drug can capture a large share of the world market, a direct launch tends to be chosen.
The positive IPP eect on the probability of an alliance exists because the imitation cost of the partner
ﬁrm, C, is high; therefore, the partner has less incentive to imitate. The eect of scope economies exists
because ﬁrms with scope economies have low costs (C is low) when launching directly. Hence, it is
11more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to launch the drug by itself. If the market potential of a drug is high, the
imitation proﬁtability for the partner ﬁrm will be also high. Then the licensee fee, S , is low. In this
case, a direct launch is likely and an alliance is unlikely. In the following, we introduce other factors
aecting these alliance and direct launch choices.
3.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
In order to estimate the probability of the ﬁrm choosing an alliance, we specify the payos as follows:
S  = aX + ea
 = dX + ed;
where X represents the factors aecting the payos, a and d are the coecients speciﬁc to each
choice, ea and ed are error terms, and a corresponds to alliance and d to direct launch. By assuming






X); m;m0 = n;a;d;
where m shows choice and n corresponds to no launch. The coecients depict the relative eect from
the base choice, no launch.
12The estimation speciﬁcation of mX for ﬁrm k, drug i, and country c is:
mXkic = m
0 + m
1 Distancec + m
2 Subsidiaryk + m
3 World Compi + m
4 Scope Econk + m
5 Sizek
+ m
6 Drug Agei + m
7 World Market Sizei + m
8 Popc + m
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mWic + em:
We use the variables associated with company, drug, and country characteristics. The covariates con-
sidered in the international trade literature are also included. The following is the list of covariates.
 Distance: distance from Japan.
 Subsidiary: presence of a subsidiary in a country.
 World Comp: number of competitors (ﬁrms) in the same therapy class.
 Scope Econ: number of drugs associated with each ﬁrm.
 Size: number of employees.
 Drug Age: years since ﬁrst launch.
 World Market Size: worldwide drug sales calculated by PJB.
 Pop: population in 2006.
 GDP: per capita GDP in 2006.
 Same Class Drug: the number of drugs in the same therapy class and country.
 IPP: IPP measure by Park and Wagh (2002).
 Local Firms: the number of local ﬁrms with at least one launched drug in the same country.
13We use distance to control for trade and management costs, a decision inspired by gravity models (see
for example, Disdier and Head (2008)). The distance is the Great Circle distance between capital cities.
The index of the presence of a foreign subsidiary is used to control for the eect of local base on not
only direct launches but also alliances. This is because the presence of a local subsidiary may aect
the bargaining process of alliances. This index takes the value of 1 if there are foreign aliates and 0
otherwise.
Therapy Comp represents the number of pharmaceutical ﬁrms in the world that produce drugs in
the same therapy class. This is considered to be competitive pressure in the world market. Scope Econ
is the number of drugs the ﬁrm has been associated with. If there are scope economies, direct launches
will be promoted. We used the number of employees to control for size and scale economies. Note that
several chemical companies have large numbers of employees, so we include a chemical ﬁrm dummy
to take chemical ﬁrm characteristics into account. Drug Age is the year since a drug was ﬁrst launched,
which controls for the market perception of drugs. The larger Drug Age is, the less uncertainty there is
in drug sales. World Market Size is the world total of sales calculated by PJB, which controls for the
market potential of each drug. This can be a proxy for drug quality.
Pop is the population and GDP is per capita gross domestic product. These variables capture the
demand side characteristics. Same Class Drug is the number of drugs in each country and in each
therapy class. This can be a proxy for local patterns of health and diseases and local regulations. A
particular health and disease pattern may create demand for drugs, and regulatory regimes aect the
availability of drugs in each country. IPP is the IPP measure developed by Park and Wagh (2002).
Local Firms is the number of local pharmaceutical ﬁrms. This may show the imitation opportunities
in a local market. Finally, the variables in W are dummies; we used a Japan dummy to control for
Japanese market-speciﬁc eects; we used broad class therapy dummies to control for therapy-speciﬁc
14eects. Because of the multicollinearity problem, we did not use all therapy dummies.
As Kyle (2007) shows, a country’s adoption of a price control policy aects entry decision signif-
icantly. Because in this data there is a correlation between the price control index and other country-
speciﬁc variables, including price control creates a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, because it is
dicult to create a proper measure of regulations, we consider Same Class Drug as a proxy for these
country-speciﬁc regulatory eects. Because using Same Class Drug may create an endogeneity prob-
lem, we also used the number of other therapy class drugs in the estimations and the results proved to
be qualitatively similar.
4 Estimation Results
In this section, we report our estimation results and discuss the implications for company strategies and
market supply patterns. Table 2 reports the results of multinomial logit estimation of entry mode choice.
The odd numbered columns, 1, 3, 4, and 7, show the choice of direct launch, and the even numbered
columns, 2, 4, 6, and 8, show the choice of alliance. While the sample size is 4000, it is 3500 when we
use the IPP measures (Columns 5, 6, 7, and 8) because of data availability.
We start by discussing the coecients of distance and subsidiaries. In all estimations, distance has
a negative eect on both direct launches and alliances. On the other hand, the presence of a foreign
subsidiary has a positive eect. The results of distance indicate that distance can be a proxy of trade
and management costs, and therefore discourages cross-border activities. This implication is related to
those of gravity models. One thing to note is that among 40 sample countries, the countries far from
Japan where few drugs are launched are South American countries. Hence, the results may detect this
South American country eect. The result that presence of a subsidiary positively aects the probabil-
ity of both direct launches and alliances implies that a local base is important not only for distributing
15products locally but also for acquiring information and negotiating with alliance partners. This result
is consistent with the theoretical result by Qiu (2006) that alliances and direct investment are comple-
mentary. Note that because our data cannot distinguish whether a subsidiary is a manufacturing or a
distribution aliate, our results may reﬂect the eect of a manufacturing subsidiary, in which case ﬁrms
may still need to access local distribution channels by an alliance.
The ﬁrst two columns report the results of direct launches and alliances when we use only com-
pany and drug characteristics in the estimation. The eect of world competition is negative for both
direct launches and alliances. If there are a large number of potential competitors, entry is unlikely to
occur. This suggests that competitive pressure does not change ﬁrms’ entry alternative strategies but
suppresses the incentive to enter new markets. Scope economies positively aect direct launches, while
they have a negative eect on alliance. Therefore, ﬁrms enjoying scope economies have less incentive
to form alliances when doing business in international markets. As scope economies are related to re-
search productivity (Henderson and Cockburn (1996)), this implies that ﬁrms with scope economies are
capable of engaging not only in research but also distribution activities. On the other hand, ﬁrm size
has a positive impact on alliances. The dierence between scope and scale economies suggests that
scale economies do not necessarily entail abilities to conduct distribution activities. Note that because
chemical ﬁrms may not establish their own pharmaceutical distribution channels, the presence of large
chemical ﬁrms may contribute to the positive eect of ﬁrm size on alliances.
Drug characteristics are also related to entry mode choice. Drug age is positively related to both
direct launches and alliances. When comparing the marginal eects reported in Columns 7 and 8,
the marginal eect on alliances is larger than that on direct launches. This can be attributed to less
uncertainty about revenues of old drugs compared with new drugs, so it may be easy to reach a licensing
agreement for older drugs (Rockett (1990)). The world market size for a drug is negatively related to
16alliances. This implies that the proﬁts from promising drugs with large markets are large, so the beneﬁt
from a direct launch is larger than that from an alliance. This result adds insight into the relationship
between quality and trade (Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005)), which is that ﬁrms are
unlikely to supply high quality goods through their rival’s channel. This is also consistent with the
theoretical result of Katz and Shapiro (1985) that major innovations that can capture a large market are
less likely to be licensed.
Columns 3 and 4 report the results when we include country characteristics. The size of population
and GDP aect alliances positively. The eect of the number of drugs for the same therapy is positive
for both choices. The local patterns of health and diseases represent a particular demand for drugs.
In addition, regulations may aect the availability of drugs. Therefore, drugs for such markets are
supplied through either channel. These country variables capture the determinants of demand side and
the regulations for pharmaceutical entry mode.
Finally, we add the variables associated with IPP to the estimation. Columns 5 and 6 show the
eects of IPP. IPP is positively related to alliances, while it has no signiﬁcant eect on direct launches.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings of international transaction ﬂows that IPP is positively correlated
with licensing royalties (Smith (2001) and Yang and Maskus (2001)). IPP may be associated with
strong enforcement for alliance contracts, encouraging alliance agreements. On the other hand, the
number of local ﬁrms is negatively correlated with direct launches. Hence, ﬁrms do not tend to enter
by themselves when there are imitation opportunities by local pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Because it is not
related to alliance signiﬁcantly, the possibility of imitation may not imply the change of mode choice
from alliance to direct launch. In a weak IPP country, ﬁrms simply may have less incentive to launch
in any form. The coecient of per capita GDP is not signiﬁcant when including IPP measures. This is
due to the correlation between these country-speciﬁc variables.
17Columns 7 and 8 report marginal eects, because the estimated coecients and marginal eects do
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are qualitatively similar between the coecients (Columns 5 and 6) and the marginal eects. While
the marginal eects of distance and subsidiary do not substantially dier between direct launches and
alliances, the eect of world competitiveness is larger for alliance than direct launch. This suggests
that competitive pressure decreases proﬁtability from alliances more than direct launch. As mentioned
above, the marginal eect of Drug Age is higher for alliances, implying that old drugs are more likely
to be licensed.
In order to see the ﬁt of our empirical model, we compared the predicted choices from our esti-
mation and choices from the data. In Table 3, the choices in the data are shown in the rows and the
predicted choices are in the columns. The ﬁgures in the diagonal of the table are the numbers for
which the predicted choices are the same as the observed choices. Our model predicts the emergence
of fewer alliances than the data indicates. This may reﬂect the fact that the number of alliances may be
overcounted in our data, as described in Section 2. However, overall, about 82 percent of choices are
matched.
While we focus on the mode choice of the distribution channels of pharmaceutical companies, the
identiﬁcation of determinants of entry is an important issue (Scott Morton (1999) and Kyle (2006,
2007)). Table 4 reports the estimation results for choices of whether to enter. We employed probit
and linear probability models. The results of these estimations are qualitatively similar to those in the
previous estimations: for example, the eect of distance is negative and the presence of a subsidiary is
positive. These factors are signiﬁcant for direct launches, alliances, and entry decision.
By combining the results of the entry mode choice obtained in Table 2 with those here, we can iden-
tify several implications. The eect of scope economy is insigniﬁcant here, whereas scope economies
18are signiﬁcantly and positively associated with direct launches and negatively with alliances. If we
consider only entry choice, we might wrongly conclude that scope economies are irrelevant. However,
our estimations show that scope economies facilitate direct launches but discourage alliances, and thus
seem to have no signiﬁcant eect on entry as a whole. The eect of world market size on entry is neg-
ative, which seems to be counter intuitive. However, pharmaceutical ﬁrms may supply such promising
drugs selectively. Speciﬁcally, they might only introduce these drugs into proﬁtable markets. Because
the previous estimation implies that alliances are unlikely to occur for drugs with a large world market,
ﬁrms have less incentive to proliferate such drugs regardless of entry mode. The results here imply that
since ﬁrms selectively enter the markets, the probability of entry is low.
In summary, our estimations show that ﬁrm characteristics aect entry channel choice: scope
economies encourage direct launches but discourage alliances. We also show that market and prod-
uct characteristics are important for entry mode choice. The world market size of a drug negatively
aects alliances, imitation opportunities in local markets discourage direct launches, and alliances are
facilitated in countries with strong IPP. The likelihood of alliances depends on the type of drug, com-
pany, and market; therefore, our results provide additional insights into how ﬁrm entry strategies are
related not only to ﬁrm heterogeneity but also to product and market characteristics.
Our results have an implication for the eect of IPP policy. By promoting IPP, innovator ﬁrms
tend to enter markets through alliances. This eect may be prominent for companies with small
scope economies. Because such ﬁrms may face resource constraints in their own distribution chan-
nels, stronger IPP is more beneﬁcial for those pharmaceutical companies.
195 Conclusion
This study analyzes the pharmaceutical company strategies of local entry mode: the choice between
direct launches and marketing alliances. We used data on Japanese pharmaceutical companies and
investigated the determinants of their choices. Our estimations show that ﬁrm choices are determined
depending on drug-speciﬁc, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and market-speciﬁc factors. In particular, scope economies,
IPP, market potential of drugs, and drug age aect alliance activities signiﬁcantly.
The results obtained in this study have important implications for understanding strategic alliance
behavior. Alliance agreements depend on product characteristics. Because our results show that rela-
tively new drugs with large world markets are less likely to be licensed, a product with high quality may
not be supplied under an alliance. In addition, because ﬁrms sign contracts to form alliances, institu-
tional factors such as IPP have signiﬁcant impacts on international alliance behavior. Stronger IPP may
not uniformly promote alliances for companies and drugs, rather it may promote alliances involving
ﬁrms with small scope economies for drugs with small market potential. Therefore, the evaluation of
eects of IPP should be conducted with other policies, such as R&D and M&A policies, and ﬁrm and
product heterogeneity should be taken into account.
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Own Alliance Own Alliance Own Alliance Own (me*) Alliance (me*)
Dist  1:083a  0:402a  0:902a  0:472a  0:935a  0:501a  0:023a  0:036a
(–10.68) (–4.4) (–8.14) (–4.81) (–7.69) (–4.93) (–6.04) (–4.64)
Subsidiary 0:994a 0:875a 0:842a 0:287c 0:809a 0:300c 0:020a 0:021c
(6.42) (6.88) (4.83) (1.94) (4.19) (1.92) (3.77) (1.78)
World Comp 0.066  0:212a  0:290c  0:524a  0:372b  0:521a  0:008c  0:039a
(0.45) (–2.63) (–1.86) (–5.83) (–2.17) (–5.48) (–1.88) (–5.38)
Scope Econ 0:384b  0:716a 0:586a  0:516a 0:668a  0:508a 0:018a  0:040a
(2.15) (–6.46) (3.22) (–4.47) (3.31) (–4.19) (3.59) (–4.35)
Size 0.112 0:785a –0.063 0:605a –0.12 0:601a –0.004 0:046a
(0.7) (6.95) (–0.4) (5.2) (–0.68) (4.93) (–0.99) (4.98)
Chemical Dm  1:068b  1:231a –0.585  0:902a –0.532  0:879b –0.012  0:066b
(–2.39) (–3.92) (–1.29) (–2.75) (–1.06) (–2.56) (–0.92) (–2.53)
Drug Age 1:279a 1:331a 1:433a 1:546a 1:458a 1:545a 0:034a 0:115a
(8.97) (12.99) (9.54) (13.84) (8.84) (13.09) (6.94) (12.88)
WM Size 0:285a –0.023 0.091  0:200a 0.036  0:185a 0.001  0:014a
(3.67) (–0.4) (1.07) (–3.18) (0.38) (–2.81) (0.56) (-2.84)
Pop –0.097 0:165a 0:220c 0.065 0:005c 0.004
(–1.44) (3.16) (1.87) (0.73) (1.83) (0.66)
PCGDP  0:372a 0:309a 0.03 –0.023 0.001 –0.002
(–4.3) (4.28) (0.16) (–0.17) (0.17) (–0.17)
Same C Drug 1:349a 1:201a 1:535a 1:191a 0:036a 0:088a
(9.5) (11.38) (9.4) (10.51) (7.83) (10.49)
IPP –0.143 0:359b –0.004 0:028b
( -0.58) (2.02) (–0.71) (2.04)
Local Firms  0:279b 0.053  0:007b 0.005
(–2.26) (0.57) (–2.28) (0.66)
Constant –0.683  3:783a –0.73  6:064a  3:782c  5:285a –0.084  0:398a
(–0.5) (–3.58) (–0.43) (–4.62) (–1.72) (–3.17) (–1.55) (–3.14)
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 3500 3500 3500 3500
Log-likelihood –2031.201 –1874.217 –1628.105 –1628.105
The numbers in parentheses are z values, and a, b, and c indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. All estimations
include therapy dummies and a Japan dummy. *: These two columns report marginal eects.
Table 3: Predictions
Predictions
Observations No launch Direct launch Alliance Total
No launch 2673 29 48 2750
Direct launch 165 106 22 293
Alliance 333 49 75 457
Total 3171 184 175 3500
Percentage = 81.5 percent
24Table 4: Entry Decision
Linear Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit
Dist  0:099a  0:384a  0:088a  0:377a  0:094a  0:383a
(–9.52) (–9.05) (–8.51) (–8.13) (–8.17) (–7.68)
Subsidiary 0:153a 0:538a 0:103a 0:289a 0:101a 0:278a
(9.83) (8.73) (6.2) (4.06) (5.71) (3.64)
World Comp  0:041a  0:147a  0:069a  0:320a  0:070a  0:321a
(–4.23) (–3.51) (–7.17) (–6.89) (–6.86) (–6.47)
Scope Econ 0.007 0.03 0.01 0.066 0.008 0.053
(0.67) (0.6) (1.02) (1.21) (0.79) (0.9)
Size 0:016c 0:100b 0.01 0.064 0.011 0.074
(1.7) (2.05) (1.11) (1.24) (1.11) (1.33)
Chemical Dm –0.015 –0.085 –0.022 –0.038 –0.024 –0.059
(–0.54) (–0.66) (–0.82) (–0.26) (–0.85) (–0.39)
Drug Age 0:141a 0:722a 0:145a 0:840a 0:145a 0:847a
(15.2) (14.55) (16.01) (15.42) (15) (14.47)
WM Size 0.008 0.038  0:013b  0:078b  0:014b  0:088a
(1.22) (1.36) (–2.02) (–2.47) (–2.04) (–2.61)
Pop 0.007 0:042c 0.012 0:069c
(1.2) (1.65) (1.37) (1.65)
PCGDP 0.004 0.026 –0.01 0.003
(0.55) (0.8) (–0.73) (0.04)
Same C Drug 0:121a 0:738a 0:123a 0:757a
(14.3) (14.58) (13.3) (13.57)
IPP 0:033c 0.076
(1.78) (0.86)
Local Firms –0.007 –0.024
(–0.83) (–0.55)
Constant 0:736a 0.255 0:560a –0.681 0:494a –1.144
(6.02) (0.48) (3.95) (–1.04) (2.83) (–1.38)
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 3500 3500
R-squared 0.23 0.27 0.28
Log-likelihood –1596.237 –1451.657 –1264.384
The numbers in parentheses are the values of z or t. The letters a, b, and c indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
All estimations include therapy dummies and a Japan dummy.
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